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Abstract 
We consider choice of options for a foreign innovating firm to license its technology 
for producing the high quality good to a domestic firm, or to enter the market of the 
domestic country with or without license. Under the assumption of uniform distribution 
about taste parameters of consumers; when cost functions are linear, if the low quality 
good’s quality is sufficiently high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the low 
quality good’s quality is low, both of entry without license strategy and license without 
entry strategy are optimum; when cost functions are quadratic, if the high quality good’s 
quality is high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the high quality good’s 
quality is low, entry with license strategy is optimum. 
Keywords: license, entry, duopoly, vertical differentiation, foreign innovating firm 
JEL Classification code: D43, L13.  
1. Introduction 
We examine a choice of options for a foreign innovating firm to license its technology 
for producing the high quality good to a firm in the domestic country without entry, or to 
enter the market of the domestic country, or to enter the market with license to the 
domestic firm. At present the domestic firm is a monopolist, and if the foreign firm enters, 
the market of the domestic country becomes a duopoly with or without vertical 
differentiation.  
There are many references about technology adoption or R&D investment in duopoly 
or oligopoly. Lots of researches focus on the relation between technology licensor and 
licensee. The difference of means of contracts which are royalties, up-front fees, the 
combinations of these two and auction are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985), 
Kamien and Tauman (1986), Sen and Tauman (2007)). Kamien and Tauman (1986) 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author, E-mail:yasuhito@mail.doshisha.ac.jp.  
TEL/FAX: +81-75-251-3648. 
We thank the referees for their valuable comments and suggestions which significantly 
contributed to improving the quality of the paper. 
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number (15K03481). 
2 
 
shows that if the licensor does not have production capacity, fixed fee is better than 
royalty and it is also better for consumers. This topic under Stackelberg oligopoly is 
discussed in Kabiraj (2004) when the licensor does not have production capacity, and 
discussed in Wang and Yang (2004) and Filippini (2005), when the licensor has 
production capacity. A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry is 
analyzed in La Manna (1993). He shows that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, 
a lower-cost firm always has the incentive to transfer its technology and hence a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium cannot be fully asymmetric, but there exists no non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies.  
Some other studies are worthy of mention, for example, Watanabe and Muto (2008), 
Boone (2001) , Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Pal (2010), Elberfeld and Nti  
(2004), Zhang, Mei and Zhong (2014), Hattori and Tanaka (2014) and (2015) and 
Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012).  
In particular, Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system when the licensor 
is an outsider and that when the licensor is an incumbent firm. In this paper we consider 
a problem of choice of options for the innovating firm as an outsider to license its 
technology for producing the high quality good to the other firm, or to enter the market 
with or without license.  
We will show that under the assumption of uniform distribution about taste parameters 
of consumers the results depend on the form of the cost functions. When the cost functions 
are linear, if the level of the low quality good is sufficiently high, license without entry is 
the optimum strategy for the foreign innovating firm; if the level of the low quality good 
is low, both of entry without license and license without entry are the optimum strategies. 
When the cost functions are quadratic, if the level of the high quality good is sufficiently 
high; if the level of the high quality good is low, entry with license is the optimum strategy, 
license without entry is the optimum strategy.  
2. The model 
Our model of vertical product differentiation is according to Mussa and Rosen (1978), 
Bonanno and Haworth (1998) and Tanaka (2001). There are two firms, Firm A and B, in 
two countries, respectively, Country A and B. Firm A produces the high-quality good 
whose quality is Hk , and Firm B produces the low-quality good whose quality is Lk , 
where 0H Lk k  . Hk  and Lk  are fixed. At present each firm operates as a 
monopolist in each country. Both of the high-quality and low-quality goods are produced 
at the same cost.  
In Country B there is a continuum of consumers with the same income, denoted by y , 
but different values of the taste parameter  . Each consumer buys at most one unit of 
the good. If a consumer with parameter   buys one unit of a good of quality k  at price 
p , his utility is equal to y p k  . If a consumer does not buy the good, his utility is 
equal to his income y . The parameter   is distributed according to a smooth 
distribution function ( )F   in the interval 0 1  .   denotes the probability that 
the taste parameter is smaller than or equal to  . The size of consumers is normalized as 
one. The inverse function of ( )F   is denoted by ( )G  .  
We consider the following two stage game. 
(1) In the first stage Firm A decides whether it enters the market of Country B or not, and 
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whether it sells a license to use new technology for producing the high-quality good 
to Firm B or not.  
Firm A have three options. The first option is to enter the market of Country B 
without license to Firm B, the second option is to license its technology to Firm B 
without entry to the market of Country B, and the third option is to enter the market 
of Country B with license to Firm B. If Firm A enters, the market of Country B 
becomes a duopoly with or without vertical differentiation. If Firm A enters with 
license, both firms produce the high-quality good. If it enters without license, Firm A 
produces the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good. 
(2) In the second stage, when Firm A enters the market of Country B in the previous stage, 
two firms determine their outputs; when Firm A does not enter, only Firm B 
determines its output. 
Firm B cannot enter the market of Country A. The markets of two countries are 
separated. The cost function of the high-quality and low-quality goods is ( )c  .  
Let Lp  be the price of the good of quality Lk  and Hp  be the price of the good of 
quality Hk ; and let Aq  and Bq  be the supplies of Firm A and B in the market of 
Country B. The supply of Firm A in Country A is ignored.  
 
3. Entry case 
3.1. General model 
First suppose that Firm A enters the market of Country B without license to Firm B. 
Then, in the market of Country B Firm A supplies the high-quality good and Firm B 
supplies the low-quality good. Let L  be the value of   for which the corresponding 
consumer is indifferent between buying nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,  
 LL
L
p
k
    
Let H  be the value of   for which the corresponding consumer is indifferent between 
buying the low-quality good and the high-quality good. Then  
 H LH
H L
p p
k k
    
We assume 0 1L H    . The direct demand function of the high-quality good is  
 1 H LH
H L
p pq F
k k
     
 (1) 
and the direct demand function of the low-quality good is  
 H L LL
H L L
p p pq F F
k k k
           
 (2) 
We have 0 1Lq  , 0 1Hq  , and  
 A H B Lq q q q     
From (1) and (2) the inverse demand functions are  
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 ( ) (1 ) (1 )H H L A L A Bp k k G q k G q q        
 
 (1 )L L A Bp k G q q     
Since (1 ) (1 ) 1A B AG q q G q     , we have L Lp k  and H Hp k . The profits of 
Firm A and B are written as  
 [( ) (1 ) (1 )] ( )A H L A L A B A Ak k G q k G q q q c q          
 
 (1 ) ( )B L A B B Bk G q q q c q       
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B are  
 ( ) (1 ) (1 )
[( ) (1 ) (1 )] 0
A
H L A L A B
A
H L A L A B A
k k G q k G q q
q
k k G q k G q q q c
      
          
 
 
 (1 ) (1 ) 0B L A B L A B B
B
k G q q k G q q q c
q
            
The second order conditions are  
 
2
2 2[( ) (1 ) (1 )]
[( ) (1 ) (1 )] 0
A
H L A L A B
A
H L A L A B A
k k G q k G q q
q
k k G q k G q q q c
        
          
 
 
 
2
2 [2 (1 ) (1 ) ] 0B L A B A B B
B
k G q q G q q q c
q
              
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs of Firm A and B, the prices of the high-
quality and low-quality goods, and the profits of the firms by eAq , eBq , eHp , eLp , eA  
and eB .  
In the following subsections we will show that if the cost functions are linear and Lk  
is small, Firm B cannot operate with non-negative profit and drops out from the market; 
however if Lk  is sufficiently large, it can get positive profit. On the other hand, if the 
cost functions are quadratic, Firm B always gets positive profit. 
3.2. Uniform distribution and linear cost function case 
Now assume that ( )F   has a uniform distribution, the (common) marginal cost 
is constant and there is no fixed cost. Denote the marginal cost by c . We assume 
H Lk k c  . Then,   , ( )G    , ( ) ( ) 1F G     and ( ) ( ) 0F G    . 
There are the following two cases.  
1. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ), the equilibrium values of the variables 
are  
 2 24 (4 )
e eH L H L L H
A B
H L L H L
k k c k k ck ckq q
k k k k k
         
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22 3 ( 2 )
4 4
e eH H H L L H L
H L
H L H L
k ck k k ck k k cp p
k k k k
         
 
 
2 2
2 2
( 2 ) ( 2 )
(4 ) (4 )
e eH L H H L L H
A B
H L L H L
k k k c k k ck ck
k k k k k
          
 
2. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ), 0Bq   and the equilibrium values of 
the variables are  
 02
e eH
A B
H
k cq q
k
     
 
 2
e eH
H L
k cp p c     
 
 
2( ) 04
e eH
A B
H
k c
k
      
 
3.3. Uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case 
Now assume that ( )F   has a uniform distribution, the (common) cost function is 
quadratic. Let q  be an output of a firm; then the cost function is 2cq . The equilibrium 
values of the variables are  
 
2
2 2
2 2
4 4 4 4
e H L H L
A
H L L H L
k k ck kq
k k ck ck c k
       
 
 2 2( 2 )4 4 4 4
e L H
B
H L L H L
k k cq
k k ck ck c k
      
 
 
2
2 2
( 2 )(2 2 )
4 4 4 4
e H H L L H
H
H L L H L
k c k k k ckp
k k ck ck c k
        
 
 2 2( 2 )( 2 )4 4 4 4
e L H L
L
H L L H L
k k c k cp
k k ck ck c k
       
 
 
2 2
2 2 2
( )(2 2 )
(4 4 4 4 )
e H H L H L
A
H L L H L
k c k k ck k
k k ck ck c k
         
 
 
2 2
2 2 2
( 2 ) ( )
(4 4 4 4 )
e L H L
B
H L L H L
k k c k c
k k ck ck c k
        
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4. License case 
4.1. General model 
Next suppose that Firm A licenses its technology for producing the high-quality good 
to Firm B at a fixed license fee, and does not enter the market of Country B. Then, Firm 
B gives up the low quality good, and produces the high quality good as a monopolist 
paying the license fee. Denote the license fee by L . Suppose that the licensor can take 
all of the increase in the profit of Firm B due to adoption of the new high-quality good.  
Let H  be the value of   for which the corresponding consumer is indifferent 
between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then  
 HH
H
p
k
    
The direct demand function is  
 1 .HH
H
pq F
k
     
 (3) 
Hq  denotes the supply of the good of quality Hk  in the market. We have 0 1Hq  , 
and  
 B Hq q   
From (3) the inverse demand function is  
 (1 )H H Bp k G q    
Since 0 (1 ) 1BG q   , we have 0 H Hp k  . The profit of Firm B is  
 (1 ) ( )B H B B Bk G q q c q L       
The first order condition for profit maximization of Firm B is  
 (1 ) (1 ) 0B H B H B B
B
k G q k G q q c
q
          
The second order condition is  
 
2
2 [2 (1 ) (1 ) ] 0B H B B B
B
k G q G q q c
q
            
Denote the equilibrium values of the output of Firm B, the price and its profit by lBq , 
l
Hp  and lB .  
If the negotiation between the foreign firm and the domestic firm about the license fee 
breaks down, the foreign firm can enter the market of Country B without license. 
Therefore, the domestic firm must pay the difference between its profit excluding the 
license fee and its profit in the previous entry case. Thus, the license fee is equal to  
 ( )l eB BL     
Denote it by lL .  
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4.2. Uniform distribution and linear cost function case 
In the uniform distribution and linear cost function case the equilibrium values of the 
variables are  
 2 2
l lH H
B H
H
k c k cq p
k
      
 
 
2( )
4
l lH
B
H
k c L
k
     
About the license fee there are the following two cases.  
1. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ),  
 24 (4 )
l
H L H L
AL
k k k k
   
where  
 
2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4
3 2 2 2 3
2 12 8 12 16
16 32 16
H L H L L H L H L H L H L
H L H L H
A k k ck k c k k k ck k c k k k k
ck k c k k c k
      
     
 
2. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ), since 0eB  ,  
 
2( )
4
l H
H
k cL
k
   
4.3. Uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case 
In the uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case the equilibrium values of 
the variables are  
 ( 2 )2( ) 2( )
l lH H H
B H
H H
k k k cq p
k c k c
      
 
 
2
4( )
l lH
B
H
k L
k c
     
 
 2 2 24( )( 4 4 4 4 )
l
H L H L L H
BL
k c k k k ck ck c
       
where  
 
2 4 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 4 2
3 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 3
3 2 2 4 3 3 4 2
12 28 32 16 16
20 12 32 16 32 64
32 16 32 16
H L H L H L H L L H L
H L H L H L L H L H L
H L H H H
B k k k k ck k c k k c k k k
ck k c k k c k k c k ck k c k k
c k k c k c k c k
     
     
    
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5. Entry with license case 
5.1. General model 
Suppose that Firm A enters the market of Country B and at the same time licenses its 
technology for producing the high-quality good to Firm B at a fixed license fee. Then, 
Firm B gives up the low quality good, and produces the high quality good paying the 
license fee. Denote the license fee by L . Suppose that the licensor can take all of the 
increase in the profit of Firm B due to adoption of the new high-quality good. Both firms 
produce the high-quality good.  
Let H  be the value of   for which the corresponding consumer is indifferent 
between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then  
 HH
H
p
k
    
The direct demand function is  
 1 .HH
H
pq F
k
     
 (4) 
Hq  denotes the supply of the good of quality Hk  in the market. We have 0 1Hq  , 
and  
 H A Bq q q    
From (4) the inverse demand function is  
 (1 )H H A Bp k G q q     
Since 0 (1 ) 1A BG q q    , we have 0 H Hp k  .  
The profits of Firm A and B are  
 (1 ) ( )A H A B A Ak G q q q c q       
 
 (1 ) ( )B H A B B Bk G q q q c q L        
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B are  
 (1 ) (1 ) 0A H A B H A B A
A
k G q q k G q q q c
q
            
 
 (1 ) (1 ) 0B H A B H A B B
B
k G q q k G q q q c
q
            
The second order conditions are  
 
2
2 [2 (1 ) (1 ) ] 0A H A B A B A
A
k G q q G q q q c
q
              
 
 
2
2 [2 (1 ) (1 ) ] 0B H A B A B B
B
k G q q G q q q c
q
              
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs of Firm A and B, the price and the profits of 
the firms by elAq , elBq , elHp , elA  and elB . Similarly to the previous section, if the 
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negotiation between the foreign firm and the domestic firm about the license fee breaks 
down, the foreign firm can enter the market of Country B without license. Therefore, the 
domestic firm must pay the difference between its profit excluding the license fee and its 
profit in the entry (without license) case. Thus, the license fee is equal to  
 ( )el eB BL     
Denote it by elL . The payoff of the foreign innovating firm is the sum of the license fee 
and its profit as a firm in the duopoly. It is equal to  
 el elAL    
 
5.2. Uniform distribution and linear cost function case 
In the uniform distribution and linear cost function case the equilibrium values of the 
variables are  
 23 3
el el elH H
A B H
H
k c k cq q p
k
       
 
 
2 2( ) ( ) .9 9
el el elH H
A B
H H
k c k c L
k k
       
About the license fee there are the following two cases.  
1. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ),  
 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
2
( )(2 16 4 16 36 )
9 (4 )
el H L H L H L L H L H L H L H
H L H L
k k ck k k k c k k k ck k c k k c kL
k k k k
         
 
 29 (4 )
el el
A
H L H L
CL
k k k k
    
where  
 
2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4
3 2 2 2 3
2 4 2 25 14 25 32
28 68 36
H L H L L H L H L H L H L
H L H L H
C k k ck k c k k k ck k c k k k k
ck k c k k c k
      
     
 
2. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ), since 0eB  ,  
 
22( )
9
el el H
A
H
k cL
k
     
5.3. Uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case 
In the uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case the equilibrium values of 
the variables are  
 ( 2 )3 2 3 2
el el elH H H
A B H
H H
k k k cq q p
k c k c
       
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2 2
2 2
( ) ( )
(3 2 ) (3 2 )
el el elH H H H
A B
H H
k k c k k c L
k c k c
         
 
 2 2 2 2(3 2 ) ( 4 4 4 4 )
el
H L H L L H
DL
k c k k k ck ck c
       
and  
 2 2 2 2(3 2 ) ( 4 4 4 4 )
el e
A
H L H L L H
EL
k c k k k ck ck c
        
where  
 
3 2 2 2 2
3 3 2 2 3 4
( )( )(16 48 48
16 16 48 48 16 )
H L H L L H H L H L H L H L
L H H H
D k k k k ck ck k k k k ck k c k k
c k ck c k c k c
      
       
and  
 
3 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3
4 3 5 2 4 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 4 2
5 2 5 2 4 3 3 4 2 2 5
3 4 4 3 5 2
2 2 25 80 104 64
16 32 71 16 72 64
16 64 192 192 64 32
96 96 32
H L H L H L H L H L H L
L H L H L H L H L H L
L H L H L H L H L H
H H H
E k k ck k k k ck k c k k c k k
c k k k ck k c k k c k k c k k
c k ck k c k k c k k c k k c k
c k c k c k
     
     
     
   
 
 
6. The optimum strategy for the foreign innovator 
To obtain the optimum strategy for the foreign innovating firm let us compare the profit 
of Firm A when it licenses its technology to Firm B without entry and its profit when it 
enters the market of Country B with license to Firm B. The difference between them is  
 ( )l el elAL L     
Similarly, the difference between its profit when it licenses its technology to Firm B 
without entry and its profit when it enters the market of Country B without license, and 
the difference between its profit when it enters the market of Country B with license to 
Firm B and its profit when it enters the market of Country B without license are  
 ,l eAL   
and  
 ( )el el eA AL      
For example, if both of ( )l el elAL L    and l eAL   are positive, license only (without 
entry) strategy is the optimum strategy.  
We consider two specific cases.  
6.1. Uniform distribution and linear cost function case 
There are two cases.  
1. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ), we have  
 
2( )( ) 036
l el el H
A
H
k cL L
k
       
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Thus, license only strategy is more beneficial than entry with license strategy for 
the foreign innovating firm. Also we have  
 
2 2 2 2
2
[ ( ) 2 ](4 10 8 3 )
4 (4 )
l e L H H H L H L H H L L
A
H L H L
k k c ck k k ck k ck k k ckL
k k k k
          
The denominator is positive, and ( ) 2 0L H Hk k c ck   . Let  
 2 2 2 24 10 8 3H L H L H H L Lk k ck k ck k k ck        
When H Lk k , 3 2 0L Lk ck     and  
 28 10 16 3 0H L L H L
H
d k k ck ck k
dk
        
Since H Lk k , we have l eAL  . Therefore, license only strategy is the optimum 
strategy for the foreign innovating firm.  
2. When 2 H
H
ck
L k ck   (or 2 L LckH c kk  ), we have  
 
2( )( ) 0 036
l el el l eH
A A
H
k cL L L
k
          
Thus, both of license only strategy and entry without license strategy are the 
optimum strategies for the foreign innovating firm.  
Summarizing the results;  
 
Proposition 1. In the uniform distribution and linear cost function case;  
1. If Lk  is sufficiently large, the license only (without entry) strategy is the 
optimum strategy for the foreign innovating firm. 
2. If Lk  is small, both of the license only strategy and the entry only 
(without license) strategy are the optimum strategies. 
 
6.2. Uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case 
In the uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case we have  
 
2 2 2
2
( 4 4 )( ) 4( )(3 2 )
l el el H H H
A
H H
k k ck cL L
k c k c
        
When 2( 2 1)Hk c  , it is positive; and when 2( 2 1)Hk c  , it is negative. Thus, 
when Hk  is relatively large to c , license only strategy is more beneficial than license 
with entry strategy for the foreign innovating firm; when Hk  is small, entry with license 
strategy is more beneficial.  
Also we have  
 
2
2 2 2
( 2 )
4( )(4 4 4 4 )
l e L H
A
H H L L H L
k k cL
k c k k ck ck c k
         
 
 2 2 2 2( )( )( ) (3 2 ) ( 4 4 4 4 )
el el e H L H L L H
A A
H L H L L H
k k k k ck ckL
k c k k k ck ck c
             
where  
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 2 2 2 2 2 2 34 3 2 4 8 4 4 8 ,H L H L L H L L H Hk k k k ck ck k c k ck c k c          
 
 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3
2 2 3 4
7 12 4 4 12 32 16 4
12 32 16
H L H L L H L H L H L L H
H H
k k ck k c k k k ck k c k k c k ck
c k c k c
        
     
Since H Lk k , we see that 2 ( 2 ) 0L Hk k c  , ( )( ) 0H L H L L Hk k k k ck ck     and the 
denominators of them are positive. About   and   we find  
 2 2 2 2 32( 2 )(2 4 4 4 4 ) 0H H H L L H L L Hk k c k k ck ck k c k c k c            
Thus, at least one of   and   is positive, and hence at least one of l eAL   and 
( )el el eA AL     is positive. Therefore, entry without license strategy never be the 
optimum strategy. Summarizing the results;  
Proposition 2. In the uniform distribution and quadratic cost function case;  
1. If Hk  is sufficiently large (or c  is small), license only strategy is the 
optimum strategies for the foreign innovating firm. 
2. If Hk  is small, entry with license strategy is the optimum strategy. 
 
 The reason for the difference between proposition 1 and 2 is as follows. The profit of 
the foreign innovating firm under license only strategy is 
ߨ݈ܤ ൅ ܮ݈ െ ߨ݁ܤ. And the profit of the foreign innovating firm under entry with license strategy is 
ߨ݈݁ܣ ൅ ߨ݈݁ܤ ൅ ܮ݈݁ െ ߨ݁ܤ. So the difference between two strategies is 
ߨ݈ܤ ൅ ܮ݈ െ ߨ݈݁ܣ ൅ ߨ݈݁ܤ ൅ ܮ݈݁. 
ߨ݈ܤ ൅ ܮ݈	 is monopoly profit with the high-quality good and ߨ݈݁ܣ ൅ ߨ݈݁ܤ ൅ ܮ݈݁	 is total profit under duopoly where both firms produce the high-quality good. Therefore, when 
monopoly profit is larger (smaller) than total profit under duopoly, license only strategy 
is more profitable (unprofitable) than entry with license strategy. 
  In the linear cost functions case, monopoly profit always bigger than total profit 
under duopoly so the foreign innovating firm uses license only strategy. If the domestic 
firm is weak and drops out when the foreign innovating firm enters the domestic 
market, license only strategy and entry only strategy become optimal (proposition 1-2).  
The foreign innovating firm always gets monopoly profit. 
  On the other hand, in the quadratic cost functions case, total profit under duopoly 
may become larger than monopoly profit so the foreign innovating firm uses entry with 
license strategy (proposition 2-2). In this case, marginal cost becomes large as 
production becomes large, so the foreign innovating firm enters the domestic market 
and produce with small marginal cost although the market becomes more competitive. 
But when ܿ is small (or Hk  is large), the result approaches to the result under linear 
cost functions, so license only strategy is optimal like proposition 1. 
 
7. A note on extension to endogenous quality model 
Nguyen (2014) and Nguyen, Sgro and Nabin (2014) presented models of vertical 
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product differentiation with endogenous quality choice by firms. In particular, Nguyen, 
Sgro and Nabin (2014) analyzed a licensing problem in a duopoly with a foreign 
innovating firm which has a new technology to produce a higher quality good.  
Our analysis can be extended to a case of endogenous quality choice. For example, let 
us consider the entry without license case. Assume uniform distribution of consumers’ 
taste parameter. Suppose that Firm A produces a good of quality Ak , and Firm B 
produces a good of quality Bk . A Bk k . Let B  be the value of   for which the 
corresponding consumer is indifferent between buying nothing and buying Firm B’s 
good. Then, B
B
p
B k  . Let A  be the value of   for which the corresponding 
consumer is indifferent between buying Firm A’s good and Firm B’s good. Then, 
A B
A B
p p
A k k  . Ap  and Bp  are the prices of the goods. Assume that the constant 
marginal cost of Firm A is 212 Ak , and that of Firm B is 
2
Bk . Let Aq  and Bq  be the 
outputs of Firm A and B. Then, the inverse demand functions are written as follows. 
 ( )(1 ) (1 )A A B A B A Bp k k q k q q        (1 )B B A Bp k q q     
The profits of Firm A and B are 
 21[( )(1 ) (1 )] 2A A B A B A B A A Ak k q k q q q k q          
2(1 )B B A B B B Bk q q q k q       
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B with respect to the 
outputs are  
 21( )(1 ) (1 ) 02A B A B A B A A Ak k q k q q k q k          
and  
 2(1 ) 0B A B B B Bk q q k q k       
The equilibrium outputs of the goods and the profits of the firms are  
 
2 22 (2 4 )
4 2(4 )
A B A B A A B
A B
A B A B
k k k k k k kq q
k k k k
          
 
 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
(2 ) (2 4 )
(4 ) 4(4 )
A A B A B A B A B
A B
A B A B
k k k k k k k k k
k k k k
           
Given these equilibrium profits the firms choose their quality. The conditions for profit 
maximization with respect to the quality are  
 3 2 2 2 3 24 5 2 12 8 0B A B B A B A B A Ak k k k k k k k k k         
for Firm A, and  
 2 24 47 2 4 8 0B A B B A Ak k k k k k       
for Firm B. The firms choose the following quality  
 0 6882 0 2523A Bk k       
The full analyses using the model of endogenous quality choice are future challenges. 
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8. Concluding Remark 
We have analyzed a choice of the foreign innovating firm to license its technology for 
producing the high quality good to a domestic firm or to enter the market, which is 
monopolistic, of the domestic country, with or without license. We have shown that the 
relative benefit of license and entry depends on the form of cost functions.  
In the future research we want to study the problem in oligopoly, and public policy by 
the government of the domestic country to promote or prevent license or entry by the 
foreign firm. As we mentioned in the previous section, our analysis can be extended to a 
case of endogenous quality choice2. 
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